

Framework Conditions and Entrepreneurial Support Structures in Morocco : A GEM-Based Qualitative Analysis

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Abstract:

Morocco has sustained two decades of institutional investment in entrepreneurial support infrastructure: incubators, accelerators, and public programmes have all multiplied. Yet the gap between entrepreneurial intention and actual venture creation remains. This paper responds to a specific and documented gap in the literature: despite growing policy activity, the internal functioning of Moroccan entrepreneurial support structures at the organizational level remains empirically undocumented in peer-reviewed research. How do support structures actually engage with national ecosystem conditions? Which conditions do they address, which do they structurally neglect, and through what mechanisms do ecosystem dysfunctions reproduce themselves at the organizational level? We address this question through a qualitative field study combining documentary review and semi-structured interviews with managers and accompanied entrepreneurs across seven purposively sampled support structures in Casablanca, selected for operational maturity and typological diversity. Cross-case analysis mapped each structure's observed practices against the nine GEM Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions. Three findings emerge at distinct levels. The primary empirical result is that Morocco's support landscape is organizationally diverse but structurally incoherent: no shared strategy, referral system, or coordinating mechanism connects the seven structures. The two secondary empirical findings concern financing access (only 2 of 7 structures formally integrate investment facilitation) and post-creation support (5 of 7 structures terminate at business registration). The core analytical finding is that these gaps reproduce through institutional design: a performance measurement architecture that rewards throughput counts rather than firm survival systematically disincentivizes post-creation engagement. Morocco climbed from 39th to 30th in GEM's National Entrepreneurial Context Index between 2020 and 2024. This aggregate progress primarily reflects gains in peripheral conditions such as physical infrastructure, while the conditions most critical to entrepreneurial survival remain structurally weak. This finding contributes to the ecosystem literature by demonstrating that rising aggregate ecosystem indices can conceal persistent organizational-level dysfunctions, a pattern likely to recur in comparable emerging economies.

Keywords: Entrepreneurial framework conditions; support structures; GEM model; entrepreneurial ecosystem; Morocco; incubators; emerging economies.

JEL Classification: L26; O17; O55

Paper type : Empirical Research

1. Introduction

The relationship between entrepreneurship and national economic development is well documented in comparative research (Audretsch & Belitski, 2017; Isenberg, 2011). Morocco, a middle-income country with persistent youth unemployment and a labor market that has not kept pace with demographic growth, has placed entrepreneurship at the center of its national development strategy, particularly under the Vision 2030 framework.

The empirical contradiction at the heart of this paper is the following: Morocco has more support structures, more public programmes, and a better NECI ranking than at any previous point in its history, yet the gap between entrepreneurial intention and actual venture creation has not closed proportionally (GEM, 2024). Existing research addresses ecosystem conditions at a macro level (Stam & Spiegel, 2016) and the general typology of support structures (Albert et al., 2003; Mian et al., 2016), but the organizational-level mechanisms by which support structures engage with or exacerbate ecosystem conditions in Morocco are empirically undocumented. This is the scientific gap this paper addresses.

The study focuses on Casablanca, which concentrates over 60 percent of Morocco's formal entrepreneurial activity and hosts the densest cluster of operational support structures in the country (GEM, 2018; Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2022). While this geographic focus does not allow statistical generalization to the full national landscape, it provides maximum institutional depth at Morocco's most developed ecosystem point, where gaps are therefore particularly significant for policy.

The paper makes three distinct contributions. **Empirically**, it provides the first peer-reviewed organizational-level assessment of how Moroccan support structures engage with GEM conditions in practice. **Analytically**, it identifies and explains the institutional mechanisms through which three structural gaps reproduce themselves across the ecosystem. **For policy**, it proposes four prioritized recommendations grounded in field observations rather than aggregate indicators.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the GEM, ecosystem, and support structure literatures, concluding with an explicit synthesis of what remains unresolved in the Moroccan case. Section 3 details the methodology and justifies sampling choices. Section 4 reports empirical findings supported by verbatim field data and a multi-level conceptual mapping. Section 5 discusses mechanisms, comparisons, and limitations. Section 6 closes with hierarchized recommendations and a research agenda.

2. Literature Review

2.1 The GEM Framework: Nine Interdependent Conditions

The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor has tracked entrepreneurial conditions since 1999, producing the most widely used comparative database for national ecosystem assessment (Hechavarria & Ingram, 2019). Its model holds that whether individuals actually start and grow businesses depends more on the institutional environment than on individual motivation alone. Nine Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions operationalize this environment: financing access, government policy support, programme quality, pre- and post-school entrepreneurship education, R&D transfer, commercial infrastructure, market openness, physical infrastructure, and cultural norms (Bosma et al., 2008; GEM, 2024). These conditions are interdependent, and this interdependence has practical implications: partial improvements produce diminishing returns.

Morocco's GEM profile illustrates the point clearly. As Table 1 shows, physical infrastructure (6.0/10) scores above the MENA regional average, while entrepreneurship education at school (1.9/10) and government programme quality (2.3/10) score well below it (GEM, 2020). The

hard infrastructure of an entrepreneurial economy has been built; the enabling conditions that determine whether entrepreneurs can move from idea to viable business remain underdeveloped.

Table 1 : Morocco's GEM Entrepreneurial Framework Condition Scores (2020) vs. MENA Regional Average

Entrepreneurial Framework Condition	Morocco 2020	MENA Avg.	Assessment
Physical Infrastructure	6.0/10	5.8/10	Strength
Cultural and Social Norms	4.2/10	4.0/10	Moderate
Government Policy - Support	3.8/10	4.1/10	Weak
Commercial Infrastructure	3.6/10	4.2/10	Weak
Entrepreneurial Finance	3.2/10	4.0/10	Critical Gap
R&D Transfer	3.0/10	3.8/10	Critical Gap
Entrepreneurship Education (Post-school)	2.5/10	3.5/10	Critical Gap
Government Entrepreneurship Programs	2.3/10	3.4/10	Critical Gap
Entrepreneurship Education (School)	1.9/10	3.1/10	Most Critical

Source: GEM National Expert Survey Morocco (2020); authors' elaboration.

2.2 Entrepreneurial Ecosystems: The Coordination Problem

The ecosystem literature approaches the same problem from a systemic angle. Stam and Spigel (2016) define an ecosystem as a set of interdependent actors and factors coordinated to enable productive entrepreneurship in a specific territory. Coordination is the operative concept: an institutionally dense environment where actors do not interact does not function as an ecosystem. Isenberg (2011) mapped six essential domains, namely policy, finance, culture, human capital, markets, and support institutions, and argued that all six must develop in parallel for aggregate outcomes to materialize.

Applied to developing countries, Bafmo et al. (2023) showed through institutional theory that ecosystem effectiveness depends on the coherence and enforcement of the rules and incentives governing actor interactions. Kumari et al. (2025) identify regulatory inconsistency and weak knowledge flows as recurring weaknesses in emerging market ecosystems. Yuan et al. (2021), in a longitudinal study of 857 Chinese technology incubators, found that people, technology, capital, and infrastructure must develop simultaneously; selective investment in one dimension while neglecting others produces systematically limited returns.

The ecosystem literature is not without tensions. Audretsch and Belitski (2017) argue that the determinants of ecosystem performance differ substantially between developed and developing contexts, with institutional quality playing a proportionally larger role in the latter. Spigel (2017) questions whether the causal direction in ecosystem research is adequately theorized: it remains unclear whether ecosystem conditions produce entrepreneurial activity or whether entrepreneurial activity produces the conditions. Harrison and Leitch (2010) further note that policy-driven ecosystems in developing economies tend to converge on visible institutional forms while neglecting the less visible relational dimensions that drive performance in organic ecosystems.

In the MENA and North African context specifically, Lamine et al. (2015) documented weak university-industry linkages and low R&D transfer capacity as common constraints across Maghreb economies. Zahra and Wright (2016) noted that informal institutional norms, including risk aversion and social stigma around failure, exert a stronger constraining effect on entrepreneurial behavior in collectivist societies than standard EFC models typically capture. In Morocco, these cultural dimensions interact with structural financing gaps to produce particularly low rates of opportunity-driven entrepreneurship relative to necessity-driven activity (GEM, 2020).

2.3 Support Structures: What Works and What the Evidence Leaves Open

Business incubation originated in the United States in the late 1950s and has diversified

considerably (Albert et al., 2003). The main models include full-chain incubators, pre-incubators, sector-specific structures, growth-stage accelerators, and mentoring networks. Albert et al.'s (2003) typology, mapping these models against stages of the entrepreneurial journey, provides the organizational framework applied in this paper. Cuzin and Fayolle (2006) identify the quality of the coach-entrepreneur relationship, duration and frequency of interactions, collective learning, and resource access as primary determinants of accompaniment effectiveness. Theodoraki and Messegheem (2017) add that an incubator's external network quality differentiates high-impact from low-impact structures. Mian et al. (2016) confirm that post-creation support and financial facilitation are the two most consistently underperforming service dimensions globally.

In Morocco, GEM (2018) identified approximately 30 support structures, fewer than half fully operational, with post-creation support near-absent. Lalkaka (2002) documented identical patterns across African business incubation systems two decades earlier, suggesting a structural persistence that policy interventions have not yet disrupted.

What the literature allows us to understand is the macro-level logic of ecosystem conditions and the general typology of support structures. What it leaves open, particularly in the Moroccan case, is the organizational-level question: how do specific support structures engage with GEM conditions on the ground, which conditions do they structurally neglect, and through what institutional mechanisms do ecosystem-level dysfunctions reproduce themselves at the organizational level. The present paper addresses this gap.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

A qualitative, inductive design was adopted. The rationale is methodological: we were working in a context with limited prior empirical documentation, studying organizational dynamics that aggregate data cannot adequately capture. A survey design would have required pre-specifying variables, which presupposes knowledge we did not yet have. The inductive approach allows findings to emerge from field data, which is the epistemologically honest choice for exploratory organizational research (Patton, 2002; Yin, 1994). The study proceeds from a constructivist position: the assessments that managers and entrepreneurs make of their situations are interpreted as socially constructed understandings shaped by institutional context, not as objective reports (Drapeau, 2004).

3.2 Sample Selection: Procedure and Analytical Justification

Seven support structures in Casablanca were selected through purposive sampling in three stages. An initial inventory, drawing on GEM (2018) and Moroccan Ministry of Industry databases, identified 14 active support structures in Casablanca. Each was assessed against three criteria: (1) demonstrated operational activity, defined as actively accompanying entrepreneurs at the time of the study rather than merely formally registered; (2) organizational distinctiveness, ensuring that each retained structure represented a different model in the Albert et al. (2003) typology; and (3) agreement to participate. Six structures declined or did not respond within the recruitment window. The final sample of seven was retained.

Typological saturation was achieved: the seven cases cover all four principal incubation models, specifically pre-incubators (IncoScholar, MCISE), full-chain incubators (La Startup Factory, NW LAB), accelerators (212 Founders, H Seven), and a social-green tech structure (Espace Bidaya), spanning NGO-based, private, university-linked, and mixed funding configurations. Additional cases would have represented organizational models already covered rather than introducing new configurations, confirming saturation (Yin, 1994). Table 2 details each structure.

Table 2: Profile of the Seven Entrepreneurial Support Structures Studied

Structure	Type	Target	Funding	Key Characteristic
MCISE	Pre-incubator/Social	Students	Public/NGO	Social entrepreneurship; Hassan II University
La Startup Factory	Full-chain incubator	All stages	Private	Only structure with structured post-creation follow-up
H Seven	Accelerator	Growth phase	Private/Univ.	University-linked (Hassan II); smoother access to public funds
NW LAB	Full-chain incubator	Tech startups	Private	Investment facilitation formally integrated
IncoScholar	Pre-incubator	Students	Intl. NGOs	OSF and AUF partnerships; institutional affiliation advantage
212 Founders	Accelerator	Growth phase	Private	VC network access; mainly tech-oriented profiles
Espace Bidaya	Social-Green tech	Social entrepreneurs	Mixed	Green and circular economy; mixed funding

Source: Authors' elaboration based on documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews (2020-2021).

3.3 Data Collection

Data collection proceeded in two phases. The first phase involved documentary review of each structure's public materials, activity reports, and partnership agreements, building a factual baseline prior to interviews. The second phase consisted of semi-structured interviews with senior managers and, where accessible, accompanied entrepreneurs. Interviews lasted 60 to 90 minutes and were conducted between 2020 and 2021. The interview guide covered nine thematic areas corresponding to the nine GEM EFCs. All interviews were recorded with informed consent and fully transcribed. Participants were guaranteed anonymity; individual respondents are identified only by their organizational role, and data files are stored in password-protected archives accessible only to the research team.

3.4 Analysis, Coding, and Temporal Scope

Analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, interview transcripts were coded inductively using open coding, with initial categories generated directly from the data rather than imposed from the GEM framework. In the second stage, categories were reviewed against the nine GEM EFCs, and cross-case comparisons identified which patterns recurred across at least four of the seven cases. Only the latter were reported as findings. Documentary data was triangulated against interview data throughout.

Clarification on temporal scope is necessary. Primary field data was collected between 2020 and 2021. References to NECI ranking changes through 2024 draw on GEM's 2023/2024 secondary report and constitute contextual framing, not primary field observations. Organizational-level findings capture the 2020-2021 state of the ecosystem; the 2024 NECI data provide a longitudinal frame for situating, not validating, those findings.

4. Findings

4.1 A Diverse Landscape Without Coordination

Mapping the seven structures against the entrepreneurial lifecycle (Table 4) reveals organizational diversity without systemic coherence. The sample spans pre-incubators, full-chain incubators, accelerators, and a social-green tech structure. In principle, this diversity should produce complementary lifecycle coverage. In practice, coordination between structures is limited to occasional joint events. There is no shared beneficiary pipeline, no cross-referral system, and no common performance accountability framework.

This was confirmed repeatedly in fieldwork. When asked about relationships with peer structures, the director of La Startup Factory described the situation directly:

"We know the other structures exist. We see each other at events sometimes. But we have never sat down together to ask: who are you serving, who are we serving, and where are the gaps? Everyone is working independently. There is no system."

Six of the seven structures confirmed the same pattern independently. The pattern corroborates

GEM's (2018) finding that Moroccan structures blur intervention boundaries rather than developing complementary roles.

Table 3: Typology and Lifecycle Coverage of the Seven Support Structures Studied

PRE-INCUBATION	INCUBATION	ACCELERATION	POST-CREATION
IncoScholar MCISE	La Startup Factory NW LAB Espace Bidaya	212 Founders H Seven	La Startup Factory (partial) H Seven (partial) 5/7: NO coverage

Source: Authors' elaboration from field data (2020-2021).

4.2 Findings by GEM Condition

Table 3 synthesizes findings across six GEM dimensions. The categorical ratings were assigned through a transparent procedure: a condition was rated Critical Gap when at least five of the seven structures showed field evidence of structural failure on that dimension, Weak when three or four cases showed evidence, and Moderate when evidence was mixed or partial.

Table 4: Summary of Findings by GEM Entrepreneurial Framework Condition

GEM EFC Dimension	Rating	Key Finding
Entrepreneurial Finance	Critical Gap	2/7 structures integrate investment facilitation; seed funding gap persists for all non-tech profiles
Government Programmes	Weak	Administrative barriers exclude non-elite entrepreneurs; institutional affiliation advantage observed
Entrepreneurship Education	Critical Gap	All 7 develop compensatory training; heterogeneous approaches prevent common baseline
Commercial Infrastructure	Moderate	Physical infrastructure adequate; commercial network quality varies significantly by structure type
Post-Creation Support	Critical Gap	5/7 terminate at registration; performance indicators reward throughput, not survival
Ecosystem Coordination	Weak	Occasional joint events only; no shared strategy, pipeline, or accountability framework

Source: Authors' analysis from interview and documentary data; ratings follow explicit threshold procedure (see text).

4.2.1 Entrepreneurial Finance: The Wall That Does Not Move

Financing came up in every interview, typically within the first fifteen minutes. Only NW LAB and 212 Founders formally integrate investment facilitation into their programming. The other five provide training, mentoring, and workspace but leave entrepreneurs to resolve the capital question independently. For founders outside the technology sector, this is a structural wall. GEM (2015) data indicates that approximately one in four Moroccan ventures fails to materialize primarily because of financing constraints.

One entrepreneur accompanied by MCISE described repeated failed attempts to access the CCG guarantee scheme:

"I tried three times. Each time there was a new document missing, a new requirement I had not been told about. After the third refusal I gave up. My coach at the incubator helped me with the business plan, but the banking process is a different world that they cannot help with."

4.2.2 Government Programmes: Resources That Do Not Reach

All seven structures reference InnovinVest, Maroc PME, and the CCG guarantee schemes. But actual uptake among beneficiaries is low. Administrative requirements are heavy, and first-generation entrepreneurs without institutional networks frequently cannot navigate the system. Structures with direct university links, H Seven and IncoScholar, reported markedly smoother access to public funding. One H Seven manager explained:

"Because we are affiliated with the university, we have institutional contacts inside the ministry. We know who to call when there is a problem. An independent structure has to go through the public window like any other applicant. The process is the same on paper but very different in practice."

4.2.3 Post-Creation Support: Where Accountability Ends

Five of the seven structures define their mandate as ending at or near business registration. Only La Startup Factory and H Seven offer any structured post-creation follow-up. The director of one Casablanca-based incubator was explicit about why:

"Our funder evaluates us every year on two things: how many people we trained and how many projects we accompanied to creation. Nobody asks us how many of those businesses are still alive two years later. So we design our programme to optimize what is measured, not what would matter most."

This is not organizational dysfunction. It is a rational response to a misaligned incentive architecture. The governance failure is in the measurement system, not in the structures.

4.3 Multi-Level Conceptual Mapping

The relationship between support structures and GEM conditions operates across three levels: micro (individual organizational practices), meso (governance arrangements between organizations), and macro (national EFC conditions). Table 4 maps this multi-level relationship across all eight relevant EFCs, connecting field-observed organizational gaps to their ecosystem-level implications.

Table 5: Multi-Level Conceptual Mapping - Support Structures, GEM Conditions, and Ecosystem Implications

GEM Condition	Structure Action	Field Gap	Level	Policy Implication
Entrepreneurial Finance	Referral CCG/Maroc PME; VC networking (212 Founders, NW LAB)	2/7 integrate investment; inaccessible for non-tech founders	Micro+Macro	Co-investment fund for non-tech sectors
Government Programmes	CCG/InnovinVest awareness sessions	Administrative barriers; affiliation advantage	Meso	Simplify procedures; co-design with independent structures
Entrepreneurship Education	Boot camps, business plan, workshops	All 7 compensate formal gaps; heterogeneous	Micro+Macro	Integrate in national curriculum
Commercial Infrastructure	Co-working, admin support, connectivity	Physical infra ok; network quality varies	Micro	Strengthen industry-university linkages
Post-Creation Support	Limited: 2/7 offer structured follow-up	5/7 stop at registration; KPIs reward throughput	Micro+Meso	Mandate post-creation; tie funding to survival
Ecosystem Coordination	Occasional joint events; no referral	No shared strategy or pipeline	Macro	National coordination body (Maroc PME/CCG)
R&D Transfer	Low; limited university links	Weak university-industry linkages	Macro	University-enterprise research partnerships
Cultural & Social Norms	Success story events; culture promotion	Fear of failure; risk aversion high	Macro+Micro	Normalize failure; risk culture in education

Source: Authors' elaboration from field data (2020-2021) and GEM framework (Bosma et al., 2008).

4.4 The NECI Progress Paradox

Morocco improved from 39th to 30th in the GEM NECI between 2020 and 2024. Our organizational-level data suggests that this aggregate progress reflects gains in peripheral EFCs, particularly physical infrastructure, while the foundational conditions most directly linked to entrepreneurial survival have moved more slowly. The ecosystem has more organizational pieces than before. It has not, on the evidence of our fieldwork, developed significantly greater systemic coherence.

5. Discussion

5.1 Theoretical Implications and Causal Mechanisms

The findings speak to three debates. On the systemic question, they provide organizational-level evidence for the argument advanced by Stam and Spigel (2016) and Isenberg (2011) that ecosystem performance depends on interactions rather than on individual actor strength. Morocco's structures do reasonable work in isolation. Aggregated, they produce less than their sum because coordination mechanisms are absent and the incentive architecture rewards

throughput over survival. Mason and Brown's (2014) proposition that ecosystem coherence drives aggregate outcomes is empirically grounded here.

The causal mechanism through which the post-creation gap reproduces itself is not resource scarcity. It is governance design. Performance indicators that count training sessions and creation-stage projects, but not survival rates, systematically make post-creation engagement economically irrational for support structure managers. This is a self-reinforcing institutional trap: structures that optimize for measurable outputs capture public funding, which validates the measurement framework, which perpetuates the incentive misalignment. Breaking this trap requires not more funding but a redesign of what is measured and rewarded.

The institutional affiliation advantage constitutes a second causal mechanism. University-linked structures access public programmes more easily, receive more stable funding, and are therefore better positioned to develop long-term relationships with entrepreneurs. This advantage perpetuates inequality within the ecosystem, concentrating resources in structures that are already institutionally stronger, while independent structures remain dependent on precarious donor funding.

5.2 Comparative Perspective

Morocco's situation resonates with documented patterns across Africa (Lalkaka, 2002; Mian et al., 2016) and the MENA region. What distinguishes higher-performing ecosystems in the GCC is a deliberate national coordination architecture that aligns incubation, capital access, and government procurement within a single governance framework (WEF, 2023). China's TBI programme, documented by Yuan et al. (2021), achieved analogous results by realigning incubator incentives with long-term firm performance rather than throughput. These comparisons are instructive but require qualification: the GCC's oil-funded public investment capacity and China's state-directed industrial policy represent configurations that cannot be replicated in Morocco's fiscal and institutional context. The applicable lesson is more transferable: governance coherence, specifically the alignment of measurement systems with survival-oriented outcomes, is an institutional reform that does not require additional public expenditure. It requires political will and administrative redesign.

5.3 Limitations

Three limitations condition the interpretation of these findings. Geographic restriction to Casablanca means that secondary cities and rural areas, where institutional density is lower, are likely to exhibit more severe ecosystem dysfunctions than our data captures. Findings on the institutional affiliation advantage and donor dependence should therefore be read as conservative estimates of their national scope. The qualitative design produces analytical depth but no statistical generalizability; the three structural gaps documented are recurrent across our cases, but their relative severity varies across organizational types and national regions in ways this study cannot measure. Finally, data collection during COVID-19 likely amplified accounts of financial difficulty; the financing gap and post-creation gap are almost certainly structural features of the ecosystem, but their magnitude may be partially inflated by pandemic conditions.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This paper set out to document and explain why Morocco's expanding support infrastructure has not produced proportional improvements in entrepreneurial outcomes. Seven organizational case studies in Casablanca produced consistent findings across all three analytical levels. **Empirically**, Morocco has built organizational diversity without ecosystem coherence: structures of different types exist but do not coordinate, disengage from entrepreneurs at registration, and leave the financing problem largely unresolved. **Analytically**, these gaps

reproduce through two institutional mechanisms: a performance measurement architecture that incentivizes throughput over survival, and an institutional affiliation advantage that concentrates public funding access in university-linked structures. **Theoretically**, the paper contributes to the ecosystem literature by demonstrating that rising aggregate NECI indices can conceal persistent organizational-level dysfunctions, and that the causal mechanisms driving these dysfunctions are institutional design problems rather than resource problems.

Four policy recommendations follow, presented in order of institutional priority and feasibility. **First, and most urgently: governance reform of the performance measurement architecture.** All publicly supported structures should be evaluated against multi-year enterprise survival and growth metrics. This requires no new resources; it requires redesigning the evaluation framework used by public funders and oversight bodies. The institutional actors best positioned to lead this reform are Maroc PME and the CCG.

Second: a national coordination mechanism. A cross-ministerial body should map structure coverage, identify lifecycle gaps, eliminate redundancies, and create shared accountability for ecosystem-level outcomes. Housing this within an existing institution, such as Maroc PME or the CCG, reduces the institutional creation cost.

Third: structured co-investment mechanisms. Guarantee-backed seed funds co-managed with support structures would extend financing access beyond the tech-oriented profiles currently served by private VC networks. Implementation requires coordination between the Ministry of Finance, the CCG, and support structure managers.

Fourth: entrepreneurship education reform. Integrating entrepreneurship as a substantive curriculum component at secondary and tertiary levels would reduce the compensatory training burden currently borne by support structures and raise the baseline quality of entrepreneurs entering the support pipeline.

Future research should extend this analysis beyond Casablanca to secondary cities and rural areas, develop quantitative instruments to test the relative impact of specific EFC deficiencies on entrepreneurial outcomes nationally, and conduct longitudinal studies tracking venture survival after incubation to measure the actual cost of the post-creation gap.

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